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TOXIC TORTS: THE DEVIL IS IN THE DOSE 
Bernard D. Goldstein, M.D.∗ 
SUMMARY 
Dose is a central concept in toxicology—”the dose makes the 
poison” is the oldest maxim in the field.1 The judicial system 
nevertheless appears uncomfortable in dealing with dose issues and 
instead prefers reductionist approaches which overly simplify 
decision-making about general and specific causation in toxic tort 
cases to the detriment of both plaintiffs and defendants. 
Contrasting this approach, scientific enquiry is moving toward a 
more systems based, holistic approach to incorporating a broad 
range of scientific evidence. This is particularly true for the 
examination of chemical causation of disease. Longstanding science-
based processes evaluating the weight of evidence have increased 
the extent to which they incorporate scientific data from multiple 
disciplines, including toxicological studies exploring dose-related 
                                                           
 ∗ Bernard D. Goldstein is Professor of Environmental and Occupational 
Health and former Dean of the University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of 
Public Health. The author would like to thank Russellyn Carruth of the 
University of Pittsburgh School of Law for her many insightful observations on 
this subject and for her contributions to this manuscript. The author also thanks 
Jennifer Geiselhart for her very helpful advice and Jessica Kanzler for her 
technical assistance. 
1 See David L. Eaton, Scientific Judgment and Toxic Torts— A Primer in 
Toxicology for Judges and Lawyers, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 5, 15 (2003). 
 “Dose” is defined as concentration multiplied by frequency or duration.  
Thus exposure to 10 parts per million (“ppm”) in air for one hour to a pollutant 
is a dose of 10 ppm-hours.  Exposure to 1 ppm in air for 10 hours also results in 
a dose of 10 ppm-hours.  In the first example the dose rate is higher than the 
second example, but the total dose is the same. 
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mechanisms of disease. This runs counter to recent judicial 
decisions that more narrowly define the evidence acceptable in a 
toxic tort case.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The interface of science and law is central to toxic tort 
litigation. The challenge of eliciting valid and pertinent expert 
opinions in toxic tort cases has led to changes in the role of the 
judge and to what is admissible in court.3 Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.4 and other cases have had a major impact 
upon toxic tort litigation at a time when the science is also changing 
rapidly.5 This article explores the role of the central toxicological 
concept of dose in toxic tort litigation. Additionally, this article 
contends that science and law are going in opposite directions—in 
science towards a more systems-based holistic approach to 
                                                           
2 This article focuses upon environmental cases. Litigation concerning 
pharmaceuticals and medical devices may raise different issues because of the role 
of the FDA. See infra text accompanying notes 27–31. 
3 See sources cited infra note 5. 
4 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
5 I will not delve into the legal arguments concerning whether the intention 
of the Supreme Court in Daubert was to liberalize the rules of scientific 
evidence. The proposition that in fact the opposite has occurred has been 
advanced by legal scholars and by scientists. See Lisa Heinzerling, Doubting 
Daubert, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 65 (2006) (discussing the “mess that has followed 
in the wake of Daubert”); Ronald L. Melnick, A Daubert Motion: A Legal 
Strategy to Exclude Essential Scientific Evidence in Toxic Tort Litigation, 95 
AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH S30 (2005) (discussing difficulties for plaintiffs to prevail 
in Daubert motions); CARL F. CRANOR, Judge-Jury Responsibilities and the 
Right to a Jury Trial, in TOXIC TORTS: SCIENCE, LAW, AND THE POSSIBILITY 
OF JUSTICE 70–71 (2006) (noting that, under Daubert, plaintiffs have to “win 
twice”). This proposition is consistent with my argument that courts have 
generally become reductionist in their approach to toxic torts. The potential 
impact on toxic torts of changes in science arising out of molecular biology and 
increased understanding of the human genome have been discussed by Gary 
Marchant and by Jamie Grodsky. Gary E. Marchant, Toxicogenomics and Toxic 
Torts, 20 TRENDS IN BIOTECH. 329 (2002); Jamie A. Grodsky, Genomics and 
Toxic Torts: Dismantling the Risk-Injury Divide, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1671 
(2007). 
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understanding the revealed complexity of human biology and of 
cause-and-effect relations, while in law towards a more reductionist 
and overly simplistic approach. I use examples to demonstrate how 
a reductionist approach inappropriately excludes animal toxicology 
and mechanistic information of pertinent value in evaluating a toxic 
tort. 
II. THE SCIENCE OF TOXICOLOGY 
Toxicology is the science of poisons. It is an ancient science, 
reflecting the trial and error approaches of our ancestors in selecting 
nutritious components of an otherwise highly toxic natural world. 
The use of known poisons to kill animals or enemies reflects this 
same experimentation. Toxicologists accept Paracelcus—a 16th 
century alchemist and a bit of a charlatan—as their ancestor and 
credit him with the first law of toxicology—that the dose makes 
the poison. In the present review, I focus primarily on issues 
related to dose, although I will also discuss aspects of the two 
other major maxims that are the basis for modern toxicology: 1) 
that chemicals are specific in their biological effects, which has been 
credited to Ambrose Pare;6 and 2) that humans are animals. 
                                                           
6 Bernard D. Goldstein & M.A. Gallo, Paré’s Law: The Second Law of 
Toxicology, 60 TOXICOLOGICAL SCI. 194–95 (2001). Paré told the King of 
France that he had wasted his money in purchasing what was claimed to be an 
antidote to all poisons. Paré reasoned that each poison had its own specific 
mechanism of action and that a universal antidote did not exist. The king put 
Paré’s reasoning to the test. The king’s apothecary gave a man condemned to be 
hung a poison followed by a so-called universal antidote. The condemned man 
died anyhow, thereby proving Paré’s point. Id. 
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A. The Maxims of Toxicology7 
1. The Dose Makes the Poison 
Depending upon dose, everything is poisonous, including such 
essentials as water and salt. Dose is defined as concentration 
multiplied by frequency or duration—it is not just the exposure 
level at any one point in time. Understanding how dose affects 
response is central to the science of toxicology. Dose-response 
curves are a classic means of illustrating this relationship, and 
developing a dose-response curve through direct observation or 
through extrapolation is an essential element of the function of 
toxicologists. Extrapolation may be from high to lower doses, from 
one group of humans to another, or between species. 
Toxicologists generally posit two main dose response curves: 
those that have a “threshold” and those that do not.8 Certain 
chemicals produce no effects at low doses. The highest dose at 
which no effect is observed for these chemicals is known as the 
threshold.9 The presumption that a chemical has a threshold is of 
obvious importance to toxic torts in that it permits the argument 
                                                           
7 These maxims also underlie the four-part risk assessment paradigm: 
hazard identification, dose-response analysis, exposure analysis, and risk 
characterization. Dose-response analysis is clearly based on the dose makes the 
poison; specificity is the basis for hazard identification; and both depend heavily 
on extrapolating from animal studies. Bernard D. Goldstein & Russellyn 
Carruth, Toxicology: Scientific Status, in  MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE 
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 149 (Faigman et al. ed., vol. 3 
2007). 
8 Reviews of toxicological science in relation to toxic torts can be found in 
Joseph V. Rodricks, Evaluating Disease Causation in Humans Exposed to 
Toxic Substances, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 39 (2006); Goldstein & Carruth, supra 
note 7, at 122–50; Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary S. Henifin, Reference Guide 
on Toxicology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 401–37 (2d 
ed. 2000); Ellen K. Silbergeld, The Role of Toxicology in Causation:  A 
Scientific Perspective, 1 CTS HEALTH SCI. & L. 374–78 (1991). 
9 The technical and more appropriate term is a “no-observed effect level,” or 
NOEL. Goldstein & Henifin, supra note 8, at 407. 
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that a dose was too low to cause a particular plaintiff’s injury.10 As 
dose increases, so does response, until eventually there is a dose 
which has maximal effect—perhaps the death of the organism. 
The second general type of a dose response curve is one that is 
considered to have no threshold. The most important example for 
toxic torts is that of cancer. The underlying cause of many cancers 
is a persistent genetic mutation allowing the unbridled growth of a 
cell which then results in a clone of cancer cells.11 As any one 
molecule can theoretically cause this persistent mutation, no 
threshold exists below which the risk is zero. The dose response 
curve relating the level of a cancer causing chemical to the risk of 
cancer is usually considered to be roughly linear; e.g., if the risk of 
cancer for a dose of 100 units is X, then the risk of cancer for a 
dose of 200 units is likely to be about twice the amount of X and 
the risk of cancer for a dose of 50 units only one-half X.12 
                                                           
10 This form of a dose-response curve is not only scientifically acceptable 
but easily understood by a layperson. The smallest residue of a ground up baby 
aspirin tablet is useless for treating an adult headache, but an overdose of aspirin 
can be fatal. 
11 Normally, a progenitor cell, such as a cell at the base of our skin, divides 
into two other cells: another progenitor cell and a cell that will mature and die. 
Put very simply, cancer is caused by a genetic mutation leading the progenitor 
cell to form two progenitor cells, which themselves continue to divide to form 
other progenitor cells. As a mutation can be caused by a chemical or physical 
agent producing a single small change in the DNA constituents of a gene, it is at 
least theoretically possible that any one molecule of a chemical, or packet of 
radiation, capable of changing DNA can lead to a cancer-causing mutation. Note 
that most mutations are silent, kill the cell, or do something other than cause 
cancer. Stable mutations of germ cells can similarly lead to inherited disorders. 
Cancer is usually a more complex process than a single mutation. 
12 Dose-response estimation for carcinogens is somewhat more complex in 
its use than this reasonable approximation, particularly in the usual situation in 
which extrapolation is needed from high to low dose or from animals to 
humans. There are also carcinogens that clearly have thresholds. See, e.g., infra 
notes 64 and 65 concerning saccharin. However, in essence, the “burden of 
proof” is on industry to prove that a carcinogen has a threshold. The question of 
whether a different dose-response approach should be used for non-genotoxic 
carcinogens remains under debate. 
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2. Specificity of Effects 
Chemical and physical agents have specific effects related to 
both the inherent physiochemical properties of the agent and the 
biological niche in which it functions. For example, benzene can 
cause leukemia and asbestos can cause lung cancer, but not vice 
versa. The concept of specificity—that an agent affects certain 
biological systems but not others—is a clearly established principle 
of toxicology.13 It is also intuitively understood by lay persons. 
For example, anyone may take aspirin for a headache and a laxative 
for constipation, but the medicines are not interchangeable. 
Pharmaceutical drug development to a large extent depends upon 
working out the relation between chemical structure and both the 
specificity of a desired effect and the avoidance of undesired 
effects. Small changes in chemical structure can have a major impact 
on toxicity in terms of both specificity (general causation) and the 
extent of human susceptibility to the agent.14 
3. Humans are Animals 
Much of modern toxicology is based on the study of laboratory 
animals. There is a commonality of biological function across 
species. All biological systems must obtain energy, build structure 
and release waste. The similarity in cellular and organ function is 
particularly strong among mammals such that extrapolation of 
effects from one species to another is accepted by the scientific 
community as a means of evaluating the toxicity of external agents. 
In terms of general causation, the specificity of toxic effects on 
organs is relatively similar across mammals, e.g., a kidney poison in 
                                                           
13 Somewhat confusing is that the legal equivalent to toxicological 
specificity is general causation; while specific causation in a toxic tort suit is 
related to dose rather than toxicological specificity. 
14 For example, n-hexane, the six carbon straight chain hydrocarbon 
component of gasoline, is toxic to nerves, while the closely related 5 and 7 
straight chain hydrocarbons, n-pentane and n-heptane, have no such toxicity. 
This is because of a specific biological niche within the neuron that spatially 
allows chemical interaction by a metabolite of n-hexane but not the slightly 
smaller metabolite of n-pentane or the slightly larger metabolite of n-heptane. 
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one species is likely to be a kidney poison in another, although 
there are certainly exceptions. There is more variability among 
species in dose-response due to differences in absorption, 
distribution, metabolism, excretion, function and target organ 
susceptibility. As extrapolation of dose-response from animals to 
humans is central to deciding appropriate regulatory protection, 
there is a wealth of research data focusing upon these pathways.15 
Although extrapolation can be complex, there is sufficient 
information to permit reliable extrapolation in many situations. 
A lay person reading the scientific literature might conclude, 
erroneously but understandably, that human responses most often 
differ from other mammals. This misconception is a by-product of 
a publication bias. In fact, there is a commonality of response 
among mammals, including humans. A difference between humans 
and animals is worth pursuing scientifically as such a difference can 
be exploited to understand human physiology and response and it 
is also readily publishable in a good scientific journal.16 This means 
that review of the overall literature comparing animals and humans 
will be biased toward differences rather than similarities. 
Standard safety assessment for chemicals is based totally on 
                                                           
15 Physiologically based pharmacokinetic models (“PBPK”) are 
increasingly used in risk assessment. These models provide linkages between 
initial exposure to eventual disposition of a chemical and its metabolites, 
including levels at target organs within the body. For a recent review and for an 
example assessing the cancer risk of chloroform, see Kai H. Liao et al., Bayesian 
Estimation of Pharmacokinetic and Pharmacodynamic Parameters in a Mode-
of-Action-Based Cancer Risk Assessment for Chloroform, 27(6) RISK ANALYSIS 
1535 (2007). 
16 Another major reason for the attention paid to differences between animals 
and humans is that details affecting the extrapolation of animal data to humans 
can affect regulatory agency conclusions about the risk potency of the agent. 
Small differences in the estimated potency can mean major differences in the 
extent of regulatory burden borne by the affected industry. In contrast to a 
continuous variable, i.e., which of a wide range of numbers should be used to 
set a regulatory standard, a toxic tort case in essence leads to a binary decision 
based upon the underlying need of the plaintiff to meet the “more likely than 
not” standard of tort law. Thus the details of animal/human differences, which 
can have major implications for regulation, often are of trivial significance for a 
toxic tort case, only serving to obfuscate the value of animal toxicology. See 
Silbergeld, supra note 8, at 374–78. 
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animal and in vitro studies.17 A battery of such tests, chosen for 
their ability to predict toxicity to humans or the environment, is 
performed on new chemicals. Extending animal and in vitro testing 
to existing chemicals has been a major societal goal in recent years 
as evidenced by the international agreement to test high production 
volume chemicals18 and the European Union’s recent enactment of 
the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation, and Restriction of 
Chemicals Act (“REACH”).19  This extensive new legislation to 
regulate chemicals requires intensive toxicological testing of 
essentially all new and existing chemicals, including components of 
mixtures. It relies heavily on risk based approaches to establish 
priorities for testing, including a reliance on production volume as a 
surrogate for human dose.20 
                                                           
17 The reliance of standard safety assessment on testing chemicals in 
animals is illustrative of the similarity in response between humans and 
animals. It also reflects the fact that these are mostly new unmarketed chemicals 
so there has been no human exposure, and experimentally exposing humans 
raises ethical issues. 
18 The high production volume effort has been a joint government and 
industry activity that has been generally supported by the environmental 
movement. See Testing of Certain High Production Volume Chemicals, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 81,657 (proposed Dec. 26, 2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/EPA-
TOX/2000/December/Day-26/t32497.htm; see also International Council of 
Chemical Associations, Welcome to the Website of the Global Initiative on 
High Production Volume (HPV) Chemicals, http://www.cefic.be/activities/hse/ 
mgt/hpv/hpvinit.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2008). 
19 The new EU legislation, the Registration, Evaluation and Authorization 
of Chemical Substances, known as REACH, lays a very heavy burden on 
industry to provide extensive toxicological testing on both new and existing 
chemicals, including components of mixtures. A committee of the U.S. National 
Research Council has recently proposed a greater emphasis on understanding the 
mechanism of toxicity through advances in molecular biology as a means of 
toxicity testing. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, TOXICITY TESTING IN THE 
21ST CENTURY: A VISION AND A STRATEGY (National Academy Press 2007). 
20 See Commission Regulation 1907/2006, Registration, Evaluation, 
Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), 2007 O.J. (L 396) 1. A 
discussion of the toxicological needs for REACH and its reliance on exposure 
can be found in Sven O. Hanssen & Christina Ruden, Priority Setting in the 
REACH System 90(2), in TOXICOLOGICAL SCIENCES 304–08 (2005). Further 
information about REACH, including its pertinence to the United States, and 
particularly to the amendment of our Toxic Substances Control Act, can be 
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III. DOSE ISSUES RELATED TO GENERAL CAUSATION 
General causation for cancer can be a particularly contentious 
issue in toxic tort litigation.21 While dose considerations are usually 
considered to be pertinent to specific causation, dosage is also 
central to the general causation issue of whether a specific chemical 
or physical agent can cause a specific disease. Not surprisingly 
given the public and economic interest, weight of evidence 
approaches have been most thoroughly developed for the 
identification of carcinogens. However, it should be noted that the 
same considerations apply to diseases other than cancer. 
A. Weight of Evidence 
Regulatory agencies and scientific organizations routinely use 
“weight of evidence” processes to assess the relationship between 
a specific chemical or physical agent and a specific adverse 
outcome. These processes generally consist of an assemblage of 
both the available evidence22 and a carefully selected internal or 
external expert body to review this evidence and to develop a 
consensus view.23 
                                                           
found in the papers and presentations from the conference. Conference on A New 
EU Approach to Chemical Safety: Lessons for the United States, Conference on 
the European Union (EU) regulation providing for REACH (June 7–9, 2007) 
available at http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/euce/events/policyconf/07/index.html. 
21 See, e.g., Joiner v. General Electric Co., 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(discussing whether PCBs are a human carcinogen); In re Agent Orange Product 
Liability Litigation, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing whether 
Agent Orange and its dioxin contaminants are human carcinogens). 
22 The evidence to be considered may be restricted, for example, to peer-
reviewed publications. 
23 The contrast between a consensus conference and a toxic tort proceeding 
epitomizes the difficulty expert scientists have serving at the interface between 
science and law. Assume a reasonably mature topic with a large amount of 
scientific evidence developed by many scientists. One can usually describe the 
individual opinions of the scientist as to the weight of this evidence as falling 
within a bell-shaped curve—some scientists giving more overall weight, some 
less, but most toward the middle. The organization conducting the consensus 
effort, e.g., the EPA Science Advisory Board or the National Academies of 
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Two well-known organizations that are charged to assess the 
issue of whether specific chemicals or workplace situations cause 
cancer are the International Agency for Research on Cancer 
(“IARC”) of the World Health Organization, and the U.S. National 
Toxicology Program (“NTP”). In their deliberations, IARC and 
NTP have routinely incorporated both epidemiological and 
toxicological evidence to categorize the extent to which a chemical 
is likely to be a carcinogen. Both have in recent years specifically 
broadened the use of basic laboratory science related to 
understanding the mechanism of action of a potential carcinogen to 
help improve their categorization of carcinogens.24 
The IARC process results in a formal vote of the assembled 
experts as to whether a specific agent is toxic. The consensus 
approach first occurs within four expert groups: epidemiology, 
animal toxicology, exposure data, and mechanistic information. 
                                                           
Science, will attempt to assemble a relatively small subgroup of these experts 
with the aim of covering the specific disciplinary expertise needed and balancing 
any known biases. The group dynamics among scientists usually lead to the 
participants coming up with a relatively centrist opinion. Scientists tend to be 
conservative because of the high cost associated with being identified as 
mistaken. In contrast, the ethical and well-trained lawyer will search the field of 
legitimate experts to find those at their end of the bell-shaped curve and 
recognizes that the opposing lawyer will be doing the same. The dynamics of 
the litigation process greatly inhibit discussion among the experts (and the 
appellate process precludes scientific discussion). It is of course true that 
scientific opinion does not always fit a bell shaped curve, and not all scientific 
experts are unbiased. It is nevertheless almost inherently impossible for the 
confrontational approach that characterizes tort litigation to discover that there is 
a consensus. This is a rationale for having judges select their own experts. 
24 Vincent J. Cogliano et al., Use of Mechanistic Data in IARC 
Evaluations, 49(2) ENVTL & MOLECULAR MUTAGENS 100 (2008). Note that the 
regulatory goal underlying IARC and NTP often frustrates the needs of the toxic 
tort process to have a clear understanding of general causation. Once a chemical 
is concluded to be a known human carcinogen for a specific cancer endpoint, 
there is relatively little interest in evaluating whether it causes a different tumor. 
Either way it will be regulated as a carcinogen. An example is benzene, a known 
cause of human acute myelogenous leukemia. It is highly probable that it is also 
a cause of other hematological cancers, but this evidence is unlikely to be 
considered by IARC or NTP who are moving forward with limited resources to 
consider the weight of evidence about other potential, but not known, human 
carcinogens. 
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Although IARC is only concerned whether the carcinogen will 
cause cancer, rather than with the potency of the carcinogen, dose 
issues are crucial in each of the working groups. Not surprisingly, 
the animal toxicology and mechanistic information groups look for 
evidence of dose response before accepting an individual report 
within the literature. This is also true for the epidemiology working 
group for which there needs to be congruence both within a given 
study and among all studies. 
Dose-response is one of Bradford Hill’s25 criteria for accepting 
an epidemiological association as causal. This is pertinent to 
interpreting an individual study, e.g., workers with higher exposure 
within a workplace are expected to have a higher level of any 
causally-related adverse outcome. However, often overlooked is 
that this criterion for interpreting epidemiological studies is not 
limited to interpreting individual studies; rather, it applies when 
evaluating the totality of the pertinent epidemiological studies. For 
example, a group of epidemiological studies concerning a specific 
agent can be stratified by dose in the individual studies, thereby 
providing a means to interpret the relevance of these studies to a 
cause and effect relationship. IARC committees often prepare a 
table listing all of the epidemiological studies reviewed, arranged 
from highest to lowest exposure. It is unlikely that a committee 
will accept that a chemical is known to cause cancer if there is not a 
reasonably strong, although not necessarily exact, relation between 
the extent of exposure and the observed excess risk.26 
                                                           
25 Bradford Hill was a physician and epidemiologist who developed a 
number of criteria for accepting causality. Austin Bradford Hill, The 
Environment and Disease: Association or Causation?, 58 PROC. OF THE ROYAL 
SOC’Y OF MED. 295–300 (1965). 
26 I am personally familiar with toxic tort cases in which the plaintiffs have 
alleged that exposure to benzene, a known cause of cancer of the blood system, 
was responsible for causing kidney cancer. The plaintiffs put forward a number of 
broad epidemiological studies in which there was an association between 
benzene-containing solvents and an increased risk of kidney cancer. Such 
solvents usually contain 0.1% benzene or less. However, because benzene is a 
known cause of blood cancers, and literally millions of workers are exposed to 
pure streams of benzene, a relatively large number of epidemiologic studies have 
been performed evaluating the mortality of these workers. As these high dose 
studies have not found a statistically significant increase in kidney cancer, it is 
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IV. DOSE ISSUES RELATED TO SPECIFIC CAUSATION 
Dose issues are central to specific causation in a toxic tort case 
involving exposure to chemicals at the workplace or the 
environment. There are two issues related to dose: 1) based upon 
the dose-response evaluation, what is the dose at which the adverse 
effect would be expected, and 2) what is the dose to the plaintiff. 
Approaches to these dose issues in toxic tort cases are often guided 
by prior judicial decisions that, to one versed in toxicology, seem 
uninformed about dose concepts. 
Perhaps these misguided judicial approaches are the result of 
much of the relevant case law having been developed around 
pharmaceutical products or devices. One major difference between 
pharmaceutical agents and chemical toxins is that the dose of a 
pharmaceutical agent such as Vioxx or Bendectin is assumed to be 
that on the drug label, and someone either has or does not have a 
silicon breast implant or a medical device. Here, the problem is that 
courts attempt to transfer dose concepts from pharmaceutical 
products or devices to their evaluation of toxins; the inherent 
difference in the extent of variation in dose among those using a 
pharmaceutical product and a toxin makes such a transfer 
inappropriate. 
Another major difference between environmental chemicals and 
pharmaceutical agents is the extent of available pre-marketing 
information. For a new drug, the FDA requires a clinical trial after a 
series of studies in laboratory animals; thus, there is a reasonably 
substantial amount of animal toxicology and human epidemiological 
data already available before the drug is marketed. This is not true 
for a chemical not intended for use as a drug. EPA’s pre-marketing 
requirements under the Toxic Substances Control Act are relatively 
minimal by comparison. Further, as discussed below, the 
epidemiological gold standard of a randomized double-blind 
                                                           
not consistent with usual dose assumptions to propose that the epidemiological 
studies of workers exposed to much lower benzene doses are indicative of a 
causal relation. Note that there are at least two reasons why some 
epidemiological studies show an association between exposure to solvents 
containing low levels of benzene and kidney cancer: chance variations, and a 
causal effect of some other component of the solvent mixture. 
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controlled epidemiological study cannot be achieved in 
epidemiological studies of the potential adverse consequences of 
chemical or physical agents present in the workplace or 
community. 
For many epidemiological studies of toxic agents, dose is a 
binary—yes or no—determination instead of a quantitative 
expression.27 Nevertheless, in toxic tort cases involving non-
pharmaceutical chemicals present in the workplace or general 
environment, estimation of the dose experienced by the plaintiff, 
and positioning that estimate on the appropriate dose response 
curve for the individual plaintiff, are central to evaluating whether 
the plaintiff’s condition more likely than not was caused by the 
alleged exposure. 
Below, I discuss two of the approaches that are commonly 
used to simplify or obfuscate dose issues, one by defendants and 
one by plaintiffs. From a legal standpoint, defense lawyers often 
would like to require that there be a direct or reconstructed 
quantitative estimation of the actual dose; while plaintiffs often 
want to consider only the exposure level but not the duration 
component of dose. 
A. Non-Quantitative Estimation of Dose for a Toxic Tort Case 
It is appropriate under certain circumstances to admit expert 
testimony about sufficiency of dose without quantifying such a 
dose. One such circumstance is an expert’s comparison of the 
alleged exposure of the plaintiff with that of the exposure of one or 
more cohorts of workers in whom there is epidemiologic evidence 
of an effect. The argument in essence is similar to the right of a 
police officer travelling at 65 mph in a 55 mph zone to ticket the 
driver of a car that overtakes and passes the police vehicle without 
direct radar evidence of the speed. While the judge might be willing 
to accept a defense argument concerning the exact speed of the 
                                                           
27 This is particularly true for the initial studies identifying most known 
chemical carcinogens. These were often discovered in epidemiological studies of 
workers in which the surrogate for dose has been qualitative estimates of high 
and low exposure. Quantitative exposure evaluation was subsequently added. 
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driver, it is clear that the driver was going more than 65 mph. 
When investigating toxins, it is often difficult to come by 
quantitative evidence with which to prove causation. Employees 
who participate in epidemiological studies and experience adverse 
associations are generally part of a large work force; otherwise, it is 
difficult to observe adverse effects at the dose levels to which the 
workers have been subjected. A sufficiently large population that is 
heavily exposed can be difficult to find as large workforces tend to 
be well regulated through the enforcement of occupational health 
standards, inspections by OSHA, and the imposition of fines for 
failure to comply.28 Further, the legacy of past heavy exposures in 
large worker populations can be difficult to study if there is an 
extended latency period before the adverse effect occurs. For 
example, a mesothelioma may not become manifest until decades 
after the initial exposure to asbestos, at which time it is difficult to 
perform follow up on the original cohort of workers or determine 
their levels of exposure.29 
Smaller workforces, including the individual contractor or 
subcontractor, are often at a greater risk.30 It is in these poorly 
regulated workforces that unusual and unsafe uses of chemicals 
tend to result in much higher individual exposures. But it is also 
these workforces in which exposure measurements are unlikely, 
and estimates of exposure are difficult to determine. Again, the 
passage of years between the exposure and the resultant health 
effect complicates estimation of specific work practices, or of the 
dilution factors related to ventilation of the workplace, or even the 
                                                           
28 A particularly problematic exception is the presence of subcontractors 
working among the industry’s own employees. These subcontractors may not 
receive the same safety training or protective equipment. Michael Gochfeld & 
Sandra Mohr, Protecting Contract Workers: Case Study of the U.S. Department 
of Energy’s Nuclear and Chemical Waste Management, 97(9) AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 1607–13 (2007). 
29 While this is not the place to discuss the issue, the continued failure of 
some judicial jurisdictions to allow the latency period to affect a statute of 
limitations for bringing a toxic tort case is also a reductionist approach that 
rejects scientific knowledge. See CARL F. CRANOR, TOXIC TORTS: SCIENCE, 
LAW, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 173 (2006). 
30 The hobbyist working at home in an enclosed space similarly can have 
exposures well above those acceptable in the workplace. 
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extent of use of the putative causal agent. 
Another complication is that there can be exposure situations in 
the poorly regulated workplace that are difficult to measure such as 
leaking valves at a particular site within the complex or the washing 
of hands or clothing in solvents. For example, workers are quick to 
observe that using an available solvent such as benzene can be an 
effective way to remove greasy substances from their hands or 
work clothes at the end of the work day, but this results in 
significant yet unmeasured transdermal exposure. This risky 
practice can and should be prevented by rigorous job training and 
precautionary approaches; unfortunately, these preventative 
measures are not usually employed at a poorly regulated work site 
or by a home hobbyist. 
It is a reasonable approach for the expert reviewing a toxic tort 
case to compare the plaintiff’s exposure with that described in the 
epidemiology literature. Specifically, the expert can determine how 
the work practices described by the plaintiff compare with the 
work practices and resultant exposure of the cohorts of workers in 
which epidemiologic evidence of a cause and effect relationship has 
been reported. As an example, an individual working by him or 
herself in a confined workspace with an open vat of a volatile 
substance which splashes on their skin and clothes may have far 
more exposure than reported for workers in a cohort with an 
observed increase in cancer risk who worked in a large factory with 
much less opportunity for such high level exposure. A careful 
history of the plaintiff’s workplace practices can enable an expert 
to assess how the plaintiff’s exposure compared to that observed 
in cohorts in which an association between the exposure and the 
effect was reported.31 
Note that an indirect approach to estimation of dose can be of 
benefit to the defense as well as the plaintiff. For example, assume 
John Doe claims his leukemia was caused by chronic workplace 
exposure to benzene at a level of 10 parts per million (ppm) in air, 
                                                           
31 Information about usual work practices requires expertise such as that 
found in practitioners of occupational medicine, occupational safety, or industrial 
hygiene. This expertise can be subject to usual judicial approaches to 
admissibility of expert opinion. 
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eight hours per day. Doe sues the manufacturer of a solvent 
mixture used in his work, alleging that it was the benzene in the 
solvent that caused his leukemia. Assume we know that the solvent 
mixture contains 0.1% benzene (1 part per thousand) and that the 
mixture and benzene have similar volatility. Doe’s claim can be 
readily disposed of by estimating what dose of solvent mixture 
would have been required to expose him to 10 ppm benzene. To 
get an exposure level of 10 ppm benzene, Doe’s exposure level for 
the solvent mixture could be approximated as 10,000 ppm, but this 
is well above the lethal dose of most solvents. Had he been exposed 
to that much solvent, Doe would have lost consciousness and died 
within a matter of minutes—long before he could have developed 
leukemia. 
B. The Potential Misuse of Dose-Based Regulatory Standards 
as Evidence in a Toxic Tort Case 
Exposure to a pollutant level that exceeds an environmental 
regulatory standard is often used as evidence in a toxic tort case to 
support the likelihood of a causal relation between the exposure 
and the effect. There are two major reasons why this assumption is 
contrary to the way dose is incorporated into regulatory standards. 
First, dose is concentration multiplied by duration. Occupational or 
environmental standards are rarely set for instantaneous exposure 
levels, but rather are for durations of time that are chosen to be 
pertinent to the health issue of concern.32 For cancer-causing 
chemicals, the usual duration of concern is lifetime. Thus, being 
                                                           
32 An example of considerations related to the duration of the exposure is 
provided by the change in the averaging time of the ozone standard to eight 
hours after three decades of being at one hour. The change was based on the 
recognition that prolongation of the morning rush hour and travel of ozone 
precursors for long distances led to elevated ozone concentrations extending 
throughout daylight hours rather than just being a one hour peak following 
morning rush hour; that there were cumulative toxic effects of ozone exposure 
over multiple hours; and that children, who are particularly at risk to ozone, 
were likely to be out of doors and active for many hours during summertime 
high ozone days. P.J. Rombout et al., Rationale for an Eight-Hour Ozone 
Standard, 36 J. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ASSOC. 913–17 (1986). 
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exposed for just a few hours to a level slightly above the 
concentration that would be allowed for a lifetime is of little risk 
consequence. Second, the dose chosen for a regulatory standard is 
based on societal goals for relatively low risk, usually far below the 
risk that would be equivalent to “more likely than not.”33 For 
cancer-causing agents, long term environmental risk goals are 
usually in the range of 1/10,000 to 1/1,000,000 lifetime, although 
higher risk levels are sometimes accepted in setting workplace 
standards. For non-carcinogenic agents causing acute and/or chronic 
toxicity, the allowable standard usually has built in safety factors 
to account for uncertainties in the data and to protect susceptible 
individuals. The extrapolation methods used for cancer or non-
cancer endpoints depend upon an understanding of the toxicological 
mechanisms involved in the dose response relationship.34 
                                                           
33 One can not directly compare a risk-related standard with “more likely 
than not” in that the former is based upon an absolute risk while the latter is a 
comparative risk. For example, the absolute risk standard might be set at one 
cancer among 100,000 individuals exposed for a lifetime. If the background risk 
was a 1% lifetime risk of this cancer among all Americans (i.e., 1,000 among 
100,000 lifetime), then exposing 100,000 citizens lifetime to the minimum 
allowable level would lead to 1,001 cancers in this population. For any one of 
these individuals, the likelihood that their cancer was due to the allowable 
exposure level is 1/1,001—far below a “more likely than not” bright line. 
However, if this were a very rare cancer, such that the lifetime background 
incidence was only 1/100,000 Americans, then lifetime exposure at the 
allowable concentration would double the number of cases, one of which would 
be due to the chemical exposure. Risk assessors are rarely presented with the 
latter scenario because scientists would be unaware of the scenario even if it did 
exist. 
34 Note that the goal of environmental health science is that all decisions 
about regulating synthetic chemicals should be based solely on animal or in 
vitro data. By definition, an epidemiological study demonstrating a cause-and-
effect relationship in humans represents a failure of toxicology as a preventive 
science. Ideally, there should be enough information about a new chemical from 
safety assessment in laboratory animals, and enough strength in our public 
health infrastructure, such that no adverse consequences from exposure to this 
chemical ever occur in humans. 
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V.  SYSTEMS APPROACHES VS. REDUCTIONISM: ARE 
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH SCIENCE AND TOXIC TORT 
JURISPRUDENCE GOING IN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS? 
Environmental health science and toxic tort law appear to be 
going in opposite directions. The various disciplinary components 
of environmental health sciences are increasingly complex and 
interrelated. Boundaries between these disciplines are becoming 
blurred. Systems approaches are increasingly recognized as the 
methods by which scientific reasoning will improve our 
understanding of causal relations. In contrast, the American judicial 
system appears to be responding to the increasing breadth and 
complexity of environmental health science by searching for simple 
uni-dimensional solutions for toxic tort issues which increasingly 
exclude modern scientific reasoning. The Daubert35 decision and its 
progeny, providing judges with the role of gatekeeper, has 
furthered this trend to reductionism. 
The emphasis on systems approaches, in contradistinction to 
reductionism, is not restricted to environmental health sciences but 
is rather part of the scientific worldview of the early 21st Century. 
This reflects the maturation of the scientific community in 
recognizing that understanding our planet and its components 
requires approaches that transcend any single discipline.36 It also 
reflects the recognition by those responsible for the funding of 
science that there is a growing gap between scientific advances and 
the applicability of these advances for the public good. 
The emphasis on multi-, inter- or trans-disciplinary science is 
increasing, as is the emphasis on translation of science to decision 
makers. The breadth and depth of this emphasis is evident in the 
new directions taken by major science funding organizations, such 
                                                           
35 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
36 Even as seemingly narrow a field as high energy physics has been 
evolving toward multidisciplinary research as the norm. NATIONAL RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, COOPERATIVE STEWARDSHIP: MANAGING THE NATION’S 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY USER FACILITIES FOR RESEARCH WITH SYNCHROTRON 
RADIATION, NEUTRONS, AND HIGH MAGNETIC FIELDS (National Academy 
Press 1999). 
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as the National Science Foundation (“NSF”) and the National 
Institutes of Health (“NIH”). Similarly, the translation of science 
to the public is receiving greater emphasis, particularly at NIH as 
Congress asks for evidence that the doubling of the institute’s 
budget has been of value to taxpayers. This relatively new pursuit 
of science translation emphasizes the involvement of multiple 
disciplines. Increasingly, funding of new scientific research by 
these organizations requires teams of scientists from a broad range 
of disciplines. The current head of the NIH has used funds taken 
from each of the NIH components for competitive new 
interdisciplinary centers.37 
As the science becomes more complex, the judicial system 
appears, at least in part, to have become more reductionist in its 
approach. An example of this reductionist approach is the search 
for a bright line, such as a relative risk of 2.0, which some courts 
use as a measuring stick by which to evaluate toxic tort claims. It is 
a human trait to look for some simplifying concept that cuts 
through a confusing mass of detail to provide answers that can be 
phrased as yes or no, and this trait is magnified by the extent to 
which one is unfamiliar or uncomfortable with the tenets of the 
field.38 
Perhaps one of the reasons courts are becoming more 
reductionist in their approach to evaluating toxic torts is that judges 
                                                           
37 E.A. Zerhouni, Clinical Research at a Crossroads: The NIH Roadmap, 
54(4) J. INVESTIG. MED. 171 (2006); Office of Portfolio Analysis and Strategic 
Initiatives, Overview of the NIH Roadmap, http://nihroadmap.nih.gov/ 
overview.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2008). Systems theory is not confined to 
laboratory sciences. Under systems theory, the socio-ecological model of human 
health examines cumulative effects on human health of multiple conditions, 
ranging from the quality of housing to the presence of disease vectors. Systems 
approaches also are increasingly being used for complex assessments, such as the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment for global climate change which involved 
over 1300 scientists providing five technical documents and six synthesis 
reports. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Overview of the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment, http://www.millenniumassessment.org/en/About.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 20, 2008). 
38 See infra text accompanying footnotes 50–51 for three specific examples 
in which certain courts would automatically reject the scientific evidence 
supporting more than a doubling of risk (RR > 2.0) for an individual plaintiff. 
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are familiar with situations in which a bright line does exist, e.g., 
drunk driving statutes and speed limits. Even in these cases, 
however, judges recognize that there are imperfections in the 
measuring device.39 It is hard to imagine anyone getting fined for a 
blood alcohol level of 6.0 mg/100 ml (the inherent variability of the 
measurement is at least 0.1 mg). We also all know that we can with 
impunity drive 57 mph in a 55 mph speed zone. Similarly, a 
strictly applied bright-line rule is inappropriate in toxic tort cases 
as the technical precision of the determination of relative risk in an 
epidemiological study is usually far more imprecise than a blood 
alcohol determination or a radar gun. 
As described above, “weight of evidence” is a relatively formal 
approach that attempts to encapsulate the scientific judgment of 
the broad scientific community using all of the evidence on hand. In 
a toxic tort case, the basis for the judgment of an individual expert 
witness is subject to intense review. Lawyers insist on the expert 
delineating the specific scientific publications or authoritative texts 
on which the expert’s opinion is based, and then subjecting each 
source to intense scrutiny. Any limitation is highlighted, and 
virtually all studies have limitations. The usual scientist’s 
hesitancy to be absolutely certain is exploited to the fullest.40 
While a weight of evidence approach will consider the totality of 
the evidence, including limitations, the lawyer will attempt to 
discard every paper that is less than perfect—clearly a reductionist 
approach.41 
                                                           
39 David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in 
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 145 (2d ed., Federal Judicial 
Center 2000). 
40 Note that a scientist has little to lose by being careful about an original 
observation. If the scientist turns out to be correct, he or she will get full credit. 
If incorrect, the hesitancy will protect the scientist’s reputation. As a corollary, a 
vociferous assertion that their interpretation must be right runs counter to the 
culture of science and is not a way to favorably impress one’s colleagues. 
41 Using the technique of going into minute detail about every study 
underlying the weight of evidence, with the intention of discarding the 
foundation for an otherwise sound scientific conclusion, has been called 
“corpuscularization” when applied to regulatory law or toxic torts. Thomas O. 
McGarity, On the Prospect of “Daubertizing” Judicial Review of Risk 
Assessment 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 155, 155, 157 (2003); Thomas O. 
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There is justification for attempting to simplify science in a 
toxic tort case. A legal decision cannot wait for a complex scientific 
issue to become clarified. Further, many of the questions faced in 
toxic tort cases may be one of a kind—is it more likely than not 
that this specific exposure situation led to this specific adverse 
outcome in this specific individual? The judicial system certainly 
needs to make decisions in a timely fashion based upon the 
evidence at hand. However, the current process is not achieving 
this goal in a manner that is based on the best possible science and, 
accordingly, the process is unfair for both the plaintiff and 
defendant. Further, this attempt at simplification does not excuse 
the almost total disregard of the scientific discipline of toxicology. 
I now discuss two examples of the law’s search for 
simplification of environmental science and give examples of dose 
issues that seem to be ignored in this search.42 
A. The Havner43 Rule As A Trend Toward Simplification 
The Havner Rule in Texas reflects the trend toward 
simplification when courts determine whether an epidemiological 
finding of more than doubling of a relative risk (RR 2.0) satisfies 
the “more likely than not” evidentiary rule employed in tort 
litigation.44 The Havner Court found for the defendant and ruled 
                                                           
McGarity, Our Science is Sound Science and Their Science is Junk Science: 
Science-based Strategies for Avoiding Accountability and Responsibility for 
Risk-producing Products and Authorities, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 897, 921–22 
(2004). 
42 I was an expert for the plaintiff in a case in which the jury’s verdict was 
overturned by a Havner appeal, Exxon Corp. v. Makofski, 116 S.W.3d 176 
(Tex. 2003), and I provided an opinion concerning summary judgment for the 
plaintiff in the Parker case. My involvement in toxic tort cases through the 
years, and currently, has been roughly equal for defendants and for plaintiffs. 
43 Merrell Dow Pharms. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 716 (Tex. 1997). 
44 Several authors have written about the issue and the shortcomings of 
using RR > 2.0 as a surrogate for the “more likely than not” standard.  See, 
e.g., Sander Greenland, Relation of Probability of Causation to Relative Risk 
and Doubling Dose: A Methodologic Error That Has Become a Social 
Problem, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1166 (1999); Sander Greenland & James M. 
Robbins, Epidemiology, Justice, and the Probability of Causation, 40 
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that the expert evidence submitted by the plaintiffs was not 
scientifically reliable to prove that the birth defect suffered by their 
child was due to the drug Bendectin. The court established a 
benchmark for general causation of at least two published 
epidemiological studies in which there was a statistically significant 
relative risk greater than 2.0. 
The reasoning used by the Havner Court is straightforward. If 
in a given population of exposed individuals, ten individuals were 
expected to suffer from a specific disease without any exposure, 
and an epidemiological study shows that in fact there were nineteen 
diagnosed with the disease (a RR of 19/10 = 1.9), then for any one 
of these individuals it is more likely than not (10 to 9) that they 
belong in the group who would have contracted the disease for a 
reason unrelated to the exposure. However, if the epidemiological 
study finds that 21 were diagnosed with the disease (RR 21/10 = 
2.1), then for any one of these individuals it is more likely than not 
(11 to 10) that they belong in the group who have contracted the 
disease from the exposure rather than the group who would have 
developed the disease without the exposure. In addition to the RR 
2.0 threshold, the Havner rule requires that each of the two studies 
showing a RR > 2.0 be statistically significant at the 95% level.45 
                                                           
JURIMETRICS 321 (2000). This includes a study by my colleague Russellyn 
Carruth that charts the extent to which this bright line is being used for general 
or specific causation and considers the scientific and public health problems 
posed. Russellyn S. Carruth & Bernard D. Goldstein, Relative Risk Greater 
than Two in Proof of Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 41 JURIMETRICS 195 
(2001). Among these problems is the healthy worker effect. Workers are much 
healthier than the general population for many causes of death (e.g., a major 
cause of lymphoma is HIV/AIDS. Intravenous drug addicts at high risk for 
HIV/AIDS are far less likely to be part of a chemical or petrochemical industry 
work force). If the workforce has a 25% lesser likelihood of dying of a specific 
disease than the general population (i.e., RR = 0.75), introduction of a chemical 
that doubled this risk would lead to RR = 1.5 compared to the general 
population. There are also issues related to the biological model chosen. J. 
Beyea & Sander Greenland, The Importance of Specifying the Underlying 
Biologic Model in Estimating the Probability of Causation, 76(3) HEALTH 
PHYS. 269 (1999). 
45 Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 727 (“[A] single study would not be viewed as 
indicating that it is ‘more probable than not’ that an association exists.”). 
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The Havner requirement for more than one study with a RR > 
2.0 also appears to take out of context epidemiologists’ skeptical 
rule of thumb concerning risks that are not very high above normal 
levels. This skepticism is warranted by three common and related 
problems in epidemiology: the vagaries of statistical variation, the 
cluster fallacy, and “publication bias.”46 However, this rule of 
thumb is primarily applicable to initial unconfirmed reports that do 
not fit into scientific expectations based upon the totality of the 
information available. In applying this rule of thumb, scientists are 
in essence weighing the preponderance of evidence.47 The Havner 
                                                           
46 The “cluster fallacy” is inherent in how the choice is made as to what is 
to be studied. For example, of 200 elementary schools in a city, the normal 
statistical distribution of childhood leukemia implies that 190 schools have 
levels of leukemia within the 95% statistical distribution; 5 schools have less 
than this 95% expectation and 5 schools have more leukemia during a specific 
time period. It is not unlikely that parents in one of the schools with a high 
incidence of leukemia will raise the alarm to public health authorities (and to 
newspapers). The public health authorities will do an epidemiological study 
confirming that the observed incidence indeed exceeds the 95% expectation, but 
there is no likelihood that the parents in the low incidence school will ask for a 
study because the lower incidence of leukemia among their children would not 
be noticed. Recognition of disease clusters has been the basis for discovery of 
new and unexpected causal relationships, such as hepatic angiosarcoma and 
vinyl chloride, but most clusters turn out to be chance associations. 
“Publication bias” is related to clustering in the sense that career considerations 
lead epidemiologists to prefer to pursue data that at least preliminarily show an 
association rather than those that do not. In part, this is due to the importance of 
publishing in better scientific journals and the natural reluctance of editors of 
these competing journals to publish negative data. If at first look there does not 
appear to be a publishable finding, the observation is not pursued and no 
scientific paper results. An overview of the issues presented by cluster 
investigations can be found in D. Wartenberg, Should We Boost Or Bust 
Cluster Investigations?, 6(6) EPIDEMIOLOGY 575–76 (1995). 
47 Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 716. As one example, Dimitrios Trichopoulos, a 
Harvard epidemiologist, reacted negatively to being quoted in an article about 
epidemiological evidence as saying that only a fourfold increase in risk should 
be taken seriously. In his letter he stated, “This is correct, but only when the 
finding stands in a biological vacuum or has little or no biological credibility.” 
Dimitrios Trichopoulos, The Discipline of Epidemiology, 269(5229) SCIENCE 
1326 (1995). He then went on to cite such epidemiological findings as the 3% 
difference in births of males as compared to females. Id. 
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rule and other jurisdictions that rely solely on epidemiology strip 
away the animal and in vitro studies that form such a large part of 
the preponderance of evidence about toxic agents. 
It is understandable that judges want to provide a simplified 
way to interpret the maze of science related to toxic agents. There 
are good reasons to do so, particularly given the crowded court 
calendars and high cost of toxic tort litigation. Extrapolation among 
scientific findings can be difficult, but the reductionism involved in 
the Havner rule goes well beyond what is needed to prevent 
obfuscation by experts waving scientific evidence as a flag rather 
than weighing it as an aid in the understanding of judges and juries. 
Below are three hypothetical examples that are fully consistent 
with either the “more likely than not” or “preponderance of proof” 
rationale for a doubling of a relative risk, but such examples would 
be excluded from consideration in Texas because of the failure to 
exceed either the RR > 2.0 or the 95% statistical significance test. 
Two of the examples refer to dose, which, as noted earlier, is 
defined as concentration multiplied by the duration of exposure.48 
                                                           
 As another example, the relation of cigarette smoking to cancers other than 
lung cancer is often characterized by statistically significant relative risks less 
than 2.0. The risk of bladder cancer in European men after 20 years of smoking 
is reported by World Health Organization scientists as an odds ratio of 1.96 
with a 95% confidence interval of 1.48 to 2.61. P. Brennan et al., Cigarette 
Smoking and Bladder Cancer in Men: A Pooled Analysis of 11 Case-Control 
Studies, 86(2) INT. J. CANCER 289 (2000). 
 One can derive another hypothetical from the latter study similar to 
Example 2 below. Assume that in this study of bladder cancer and cigarette 
smoking the average extent of smoking was one pack a day for the 20-year 
period. Also assume a plaintiff with bladder cancer could demonstrate that he 
smoked two packs a day for 20 years; that, as well known, other effects of 
smoking were roughly twice as high in those who smoked two packs as 
compared to one pack a day; and that there was ample literature demonstrating 
that the more one smoked, the more carcinogens are found in the urine having 
first passed through the bladder. Further, the plaintiff had no other competing 
causes of bladder cancer and the plaintiff’s age-related risk was no different than 
reported in the study. From a toxicologist’s viewpoint, based on this set of facts 
it is obvious that a two pack a day smoker for twenty years has more than a 
doubling of risk of bladder cancer. Notwithstanding, this case would be 
precluded in a jurisdiction requiring RR > 2.0 for general causation. 
48 The difference in how toxicological scientists and the Texas Supreme 
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The third example relates to statistical significance.49 
Example 1. Dose Dependency: The Effect of Duration 
Assume that there is a common workplace process that 
consistently exposes workers to 10 parts per million (ppm) of 
chemical XYZ in the air throughout the workday, and that chemical 
XYZ is supplied by a chemical company that allegedly should have 
communicated about XYZ’s potential for risk. XYZ is found to 
produce a specific adverse effect in laboratory animals in a dose 
dependent fashion. These findings in laboratory animals lead to 
two studies of cohorts of exposed workers which show that there 
is an 80% higher incidence of this adverse effect than expected (i.e., 
RR 1.8), and that in each study the increase in risk is statistically 
significant at the 95% level. The average duration of exposure in the 
workers is fifteen years. In subsets of workers exposed for periods 
greater than thirty years, there is, as expected, twice the relative 
risk than observed in those exposed for fifteen years (i.e, a 160% 
                                                           
Court view dose is evident from Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores, 232 S.W.3d 
765 (Tex. 2007), a recent Texas Supreme Court decision extending Havner. In 
this decision the court repetitively referred to the “dose makes the poison” as a 
major rationale for reversing a lower court finding in favor of a plaintiff exposed 
to asbestos while working on brake lining. Id. at 770. See also Parker v. Mobil 
Oil Corp., 793 N.Y.S.2d 434 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005), aff’d, 857 N.E.2d 1114 
(N.Y. 2006), reh’g denied, 861 N.E.2d 104 (N.Y. 2007); but see Chapin v. 
A&L Parts, Inc., 732 N.W.2d 578 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007); Laura S. Welch, 
Asbestos Exposure Causes Mesothelioma, But Not This Asbestos Exposure: An 
Amicus Brief to the Michigan Supreme Court, 13 INT’L. J. OCCUPATIONAL & 
ENVTL. HEALTH 318 (2007). As noted by John S. Gray, “Some” is No Longer 
Enough in Texas Toxic Tort Cases, 45 HOUSTON LAW. 54 (2007), the Texas 
court in Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores required that there be epidemiological 
findings specifically for brake lining workers. 232 S.W.3d at 7. They further 
require that if there are multiple defendants contributing to the asbestos levels, 
only those whose dose is a substantial factor can be held liable. Id. at 4; see also 
Richard O. Faulk & Joy E. Palazzo, Texas High Court Heightens Scientific 
Evidence Standards, 22 LEGAL BACKGROUNDER 1 (2007). 
49 What is unrealistic about these examples is the absence of any 
mechanistic data about XYZ that would help interpret the epidemiologic data. 
Such data would exist, or be rapidly obtained after XYZ was reported to be a 
potential human toxin, but would not be admissible in these instances. 
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higher incidence which is equivalent to RR 2.6, i.e., more than a 
doubling of risk), but because the groups are small, the findings are 
not statistically significant for these subsets. Under Havner, the 
workers with the longer exposure would not be able to sue, despite 
the evidence from laboratory animals of dose dependency and the 
reasonable expectation that doubling the duration of exposure 
would double the risk such that it would be greater than 2.0. 
Example 2. Dose Dependency: The Effect of Concentration 
Assume that chemical XYZ had been found to be particularly 
useful by a small business owner specializing in restoring antique 
cars. He has used XYZ almost every work day for fifteen years in 
his poorly ventilated shop before developing the specific adverse 
effect now shown in epidemiological and animal studies to be 
causally related to chemical XYZ. An expert industrial hygienist 
has estimated that daily workplace exposure averaged 100 ppm, 
which is ten times higher than that in the much larger workplaces 
on which cohort studies are based. A physician toxicologist 
reviewing the dose-response data is prepared to testify that in 
keeping with this dose response data, the risk for an individual 
exposed at the workplace to 100 ppm daily for fifteen years is ten 
times higher than the 80% increase observed in the cohort of 
workers exposed to 10 ppm for an average of fifteen years (as a 
simplification, this would be equivalent to an 800% increase in risk 
or RR 9.0). 
If the exposure and the dose response estimations are correct, it 
is far more likely than not that this individual is suffering from the 
adverse effect due to exposure to XYZ. Notwithstanding this 
scientific determination, the plaintiff cannot present his claim 
before a jury in a Texas state court or in any other jurisdiction that 
requires dose-specific epidemiological evidence of RR > 2.0 for 
general causation.50 
                                                           
50 An individual’s anachronistic exposure to a very high chemical dose is 
often the basis for human harm, but is usually too rare for an epidemiologic 
study. 
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Example 3. Statistical Inconsistency 
Assume that there are only two epidemiologic studies on 
chemical XYZ in cohorts of workers. The first study, in a large 
cohort, reported a statistically significant RR > 2.0. The second 
study, despite a relative risk of 6.3, has a smaller cohort size and 
95% confidence intervals of 0.9–16.8, (i.e., it is not statistically 
significant at the 95% level). The plaintiff’s claim would fail the 
Havner test as there would be only one study that is statistically 
significant at the 95% level. A researcher could calculate a 50% 
confidence limit as well as a 95% confidence limit from the data in 
the second study, however. A 50% confidence limit is basically the 
range within which 50% of the likely outcomes would fall. If the 
lower limit of the 50% confidence limit was above 2.0, it is 
consistent with “more likely than not” (i.e., more than half the 
expected outcomes are above a relative risk of two). Requiring a 
plaintiff present scientific evidence with RR > 2.0 and statistical 
significance at the 95% level is in reality more strict than “more 
likely than not,” even if one were to accept that an epidemiological 
finding of RR > 2.0 is an appropriate criterion. It also seems 
contradictory to insist that the science used in a toxic tort case 
should conform to a nineteen to one ratio of certainty (which 
essentially is a 95% confidence level), while at the same time 
focusing on “more likely than not.” 
B. The Parker51 Rulings: Struggling With Chemical Risk 
The Parker litigation52 is an example of decisions from two 
levels of the New York State judiciary that appear to run counter 
to how toxicological scientists consider dose issues in cause and 
effect relationships, although the higher court overruled the lower 
court on one of these issues. Both the trial court and the appellate 
                                                           
51 Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp., 793 N.Y.S.2d 434 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005), 
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court implement reductionist approaches in the sense that neither 
court permits an expert to bring to court the full range of scientific 
evidence that would appropriately and logically be used in forming 
an expert opinion. In Parker, the plaintiff had worked for 
seventeen years as a gas station attendant and claimed that he had a 
particularly high level of exposure to gasoline due to his work 
practices which led to his developing acute myelogenous 
leukemia.53 Gasoline is a blend of chemicals that in its usual 
formulation always contains benzene. There was no argument on 
general causation as benzene is a known cause of this disease. The 
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court granted a 
motion from the defendants to dismiss the complaint, primarily 
because the plaintiff’s expert reports had failed to quantify the 
exposure beyond claiming it was higher than that observed in 
cohorts of petroleum refinery workers. On appeal, the New York 
Court of Appeals rejected the Appellate Division’s requirement 
that the amount of exposure must be quantified exactly.54 Notably, 
the Court of Appeals nonetheless found for the defendants based 
on the failure of the plaintiff to show epidemiological evidence that 
exposure to gasoline causes leukemia.55 
If the court’s finding was carried to its logical conclusion, one 
could never assign causation to any benzene source except to pure 
benzene and to a specific benzene-containing mixture for which 
there is already epidemiological evidence. Industry would be able to 
market any benzene mixture for which there is now no 
epidemiological evidence without fear of toxic tort litigation 
because the specific mixture had not been studied.56 
Benzene exposure leading to health effects historically has been 
to benzene in mixtures. This is in part because commercial grade 
benzene usually had substantial amounts of related hydrocarbon 
solvents that traveled with benzene during the crude refinery 
processes of the past. Thus, in the past, compounds such as 
                                                           
53 Id. at 442. 
54 Id. at 438. 
55 Id. at 438–39. 
56 Gasoline is a blend that contains various amounts of benzene; usually 1-
2% in the United States but up to 5% in other countries. 
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toluene, ethyl benzene, xylenes and cumene—none of which cause 
leukemia—were often heavily contaminated by benzene. The 
extent of contamination in the past led to the erroneous belief that 
toluene was also a cause of bone marrow damage—the hallmark of 
benzene toxicity. In addition to the vagaries of the refinery 
processes, the level of benzene in these aromatic mixtures also 
depended on commercial needs. For example, removal of toluene 
from benzene becomes more commercially viable during wartime 
when toluene is used as a base for the production of trinitrotoluene 
(“TNT”). 
There was never any question that Parker was exposed to 
benzene, and there was never any question that benzene is a cause 
of acute myelogenous leukemia. Instead of considering whether the 
dose of benzene was sufficient under the circumstances of Parker’s 
work practices, the court acknowledged that benzene was a 
medically probable cause of his leukemia but nevertheless enforced 
a requirement for epidemiology that cannot conceivably be 
performed under the circumstance in which the plaintiff alleges he 
was exposed.57 There simply are not enough individuals with this 
particular work practice to ever be sufficient for an epidemiological 
study.58 
                                                           
57 “Key to this litigation is the relationship, if any, between exposure to 
gasoline containing benzene as a component and AML.” Parker v. Mobil Oil 
Corp., 857 N.E.2d 1114 (N.Y. 2006) (emphasis in original). The court in 
Parker cited two other cases recognizing that an expert may not need to 
establish an exact number for the dosage at which a substance is toxic and the 
amount of exposure the plaintiff experienced. Id. at 1121 (citing McClain v. 
Metabolife Intl., Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1241 n.6 (11th Cir. 2005); Wright v. 
Willamette Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1105, 1107 (8th Cir. 1996)). 
58 I am not arguing that exposure to benzene in gasoline is or is not a 
reasonable medical probable cause of blood cancers. My short letter opinion on 
the Parker case was solely limited to whether the defense’s request for summary 
judgment was justified. I did not opine on whether it was more likely than not 
that the plaintiff’s exposure was the cause of his leukemia. My three arguments 
in favor of letting the case go to a jury were that the description of the plaintiff’s 
exposure, including dermal exposure, would lead him to have higher exposure 
than observed among gasoline refinery workers; that there was at least some 
epidemiological evidence of a more than doubling of risk in these workers for 
which I cited one study; and that the plaintiff was relatively unique in having a 
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While recognizing that I am arguing as a toxicologist and not a 
legal expert, it nonetheless seems that the burden of proof should 
be on the defense to argue that, per unit dose, benzene in gasoline is 
any less likely to be a cause of leukemia than benzene in any other 
mixture. Instead the burden of proof is now on the plaintiff to 
demonstrate epidemiological evidence that benzene in a specific 
mixture is a cause of leukemia, despite the fact that benzene itself is 
fully accepted as a cause of leukemia. In essence, the action of the 
court was to replace a scientific argument concerning dose and 
specific causation. The court did so with a requirement for an 
epidemiological study to prove general causation before being able 
to consider specific causation.59 
VI. THE EXCLUSION OF ANIMAL TOXICOLOGY AND 
MECHANISTIC INFORMATION FROM TOXIC TORTS: LEGAL 
REDUCTIONISM 
To a toxicologist, the reductionist tendency of the law that is 
most difficult to understand is the often seemingly dismissive 
attitude of toxic torts jurisprudence to the science of poisons. The 
failure to consider toxicology does a disservice to defendants as 
well as plaintiffs. It is quite possible to construct a large reference 
list of agents that have been epidemiologically associated with 
                                                           
history of radiation exposure. Atom bomb survivors who developed leukemia 
are reportedly more likely to have workplace benzene exposure than those who 
did not develop leukemia. Toranosuke Ishimaru, Occupational factors in the 
epidemiology of leukemia in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 93(3) AM. J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 157–65 (1971). 
59 This is similar to arguing that there is a need for an epidemiologic study 
demonstrating that a Chevrolet can cause trauma if it runs into a pedestrian if 
prior studies only involved Fords. When it comes to damaging a human, 
automobiles are automobiles, and benzene is benzene. Both products have the 
potential, but the extent of damage, if any, depends upon the circumstances. In 
this case the court prevented the jury from hearing the circumstances. Two 
authors that take up the issue of jury exclusion are CARL F. CRANOR, Judge-
Jury Responsibilities and the Right to a Jury Trial, in TOXIC TORTS: SCIENCE, 
LAW, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 70, 70–71 (2006) and Michael H. 
Gottesman, From Barefoot to Daubert to Joiner: Triple Play or Double 
Error?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 776 (1998). 
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virtually any disease, and these lists are readily accessible to the 
plaintiffs’ bar. 
The body of studies associating specific agents with a number 
of different diseases reflects the many epidemiological studies that 
attempt to uncover previously unobserved relationships by 
searching for associations among large databases. These are often 
called “hypothesis generating” studies. Such studies are highly 
appropriate in that they contribute to developing further studies 
aimed at specifically exploring the possible cause and effect 
relationship generated in the initial study. However, hypothesis 
generating studies have the inherent weakness that some 
statistically significant association will occur when there are enough 
questions being asked. For example, a common approach is to start 
with the diagnoses in a given hospital population, or the causes of 
mortality stated on death certificates in a given geographical 
location, and relate these to the occupation of the hospital patient 
or the potential environmental factors associated with a 
geographical location. There are many different diseases, many 
different occupations, and many different localized environmental 
factors. Using a standard statistical approach in which in essence 
one chance variation out of 20 is reported as statistically 
significant, it is inevitable that some associations of some disease 
with some chemical will be noted. 
Many studies retrospectively look at what has happened in the 
past. Testing the hypotheses generated in such studies can be done 
in a number of ways, including further epidemiological studies. A 
more probable response, which is far quicker and far less 
expensive, are toxicological studies in laboratory animals searching 
for the same effect, or mechanistic studies aimed at determining if 
there is a likely pathway by which the chemical causes the putative 
effect, rather than just a statistical association with no causality.60 
                                                           
60 An example of both a hypothesis-evaluating and hypothesis-generating 
study is the Agricultural Health Study, a large scale study of the health of 
farmers by the National Cancer Institute. M.C. Alvanja et al., The Agricultural 
Health Study, 104(4) ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 362 (1996). The study is aimed 
at testing the cancer risk of American farmers and follows a number of smaller 
studies that have reported an increased risk of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma and 
other cancers. Over 80,000 farmers are being followed prospectively, with careful 
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It is appropriate to fully depend upon studies in humans if 
there is direct epidemiological evidence of the tort and there are no 
competing causes in the individual for exposure to the agent or risk 
factors for the disease. In most instances there is little or no direct 
epidemiological evidence related to the plaintiff’s exposure. Instead 
inferences that often depend upon an analysis of all of the 
pertinent information for scientific acceptability must be made 
from the existing epidemiological literature. 
In epidemiology, the gold standard has long been the 
randomized double blind control trial. This standard, although 
difficult, can be achieved when testing drugs or other therapeutic 
approaches. However, it cannot be achieved in epidemiological 
studies of chemicals in the workplace or general environment. 
Inevitably, such studies are observational studies with various 
degrees of strengths, but all requiring some degree of inference or 
extrapolation. While it is true that animal toxicology always 
requires extrapolation across species, it is also true that animal 
toxicology can be rigidly controlled in a way that is not possible in 
epidemiological studies of the workplace or the general 
community.61 
A classic cohort epidemiological study will often describe a 
                                                           
attention to present and past exposures to pesticides and other chemical and 
biological agents common to agricultural activities. A comprehensive health and 
exposure questionnaire has been developed that seeks information on multiple 
health endpoints. The prospective study should have ample power to test 
hypotheses related to farmers and cancer, but the questionnaire inevitably leads 
to hypothesis-generating studies. See George M. Gray et al., The Federal 
Government’s Agricultural Health Study: A Critical Review with Suggested 
Improvements, 6(1) HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 47 (2000). For 
example, there are 800 possible associations in a study evaluating 20 different 
pesticides and 40 different health endpoints. It is inevitable that there will be 
statistically significant associations between a specific pesticide and a specific 
health endpoint that occur by chance alone. Statistical correction factors are used 
to approach this problem, but as the goal is the generation of hypotheses rather 
than the assignment of causation, it is not inappropriate that the association be 
reported and left for others to explore whether true causality exists. This will 
often depend upon animal toxicology and mechanistic studies. 
61 See discussion in Joseph V. Rodricks, Evaluating Disease Causation in 
Humans Exposed to Toxic Substances, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 39 (2006). 
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relatively large number of workers of whom usually only a small 
percent suffer from the disease of interest. Further, not all of the 
cohort is substantially exposed to the agent of concern.62 This is in 
contrast to a drug trial in which everyone in the treatment group 
receives the same dose of a drug and everyone in the control group 
receives a placebo. 
Toxicological research focusing on the mechanism of action of 
chemicals can also be useful in clarifying medical nomenclature—an 
issue that can present a problem to judges and juries. In the field of 
medicine, the nomenclature of disease is usually based on what is 
observable. One example is asthma, the diagnosis of which depends 
primarily upon whether an individual has the particular type of 
breath sound known as a wheeze. In essence, asthma is purely a 
descriptive term depending upon a physical sign. Wheezing reflects 
the narrowing of major airways within the lung and is a final 
common denominator of many different types of extrinsic causes 
and intrinsic susceptibilities. 
Advances in molecular biology will allow us to discard the term 
asthma and use diagnostic terms that describe the direct intrinsic or 
extrinsic causes of lung disease that is accompanied by wheezing. 
The opposite occurs for other diseases, such as leukemia, for which 
                                                           
62 Classic epidemiological studies evaluating the mortality of a 
petrochemical or chemical industry workforce can underestimate true effects at the 
work site both by including workers whose exposure is relatively minimal, e.g., 
those working in the cafeteria or in accounts payable, and by excluding those 
who may have high exposure but who work for subcontractors rather than the 
industry, e.g., maintenance workers who clean up after product spills, or as in a 
recent Delaware case, millwrights who replace leaky valves. Texaco to Pay 
Worker’s Widow $2.84 Million, DELAWARE ONLINE, 2007, available at 
http://www.delawareonline.com/apps/pbcs.d11/article?AID=/20071106/NEWS/
711060390. 
 Some of the problems of cohort studies can be approached by nested case 
control studies. For example, in a study of refinery workers whose overall 
relative risk was slightly less than 1.0, a nested case control study found that for 
those who did develop leukemia there was more than a doubling of risk that 
they were exposed to higher rather than lower doses of benzene at the workplace. 
L. Rushton & M.R. Alderson, A Case-Control Study to Investigate the 
Association Between Exposure to Benzene and Deaths from Lukemia in Oil 
Refinery Workers, 43 BRIT. J. CANCER 77 (1981). 
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nomenclature tends to split diseases that are closely related. The 
recognition of different subtypes of leukemia is abetted by the 
ready availability of blood or bone marrow which allows 
microscopic observation of multiple samples as the disease 
progresses—something that, at least until recently, has been 
unusual for cancers of most other organs for which a biopsy is a 
relatively major procedure. Thus, differences in morphology could 
readily be related to differences in clinical course or outcome. Yet 
with the use of modern molecular biology, we find that there are 
overlapping molecular characteristics between such disorders as 
acute myelogenous leukemia, the form more commonly observed in 
adults, and acute lymphoblastic leukemia, the form more 
commonly observed in children. This is not surprising as both the 
lymphocytic and myelocytic cell series derive from a common 
pluripotential cell. If the mutation that leads to cancer occurs 
sufficiently early in the differentiation process, the cancer will have 
characteristics of both cell series.63 
                                                           
63 The medical literature also tends to be confusing for toxic tort litigation 
because of the organizational structure of medical specialties and their journals. 
For example, a relatively minor brain tumor type is a solitary lymphoma. The 
patient will usually present to a neurologist for the evaluation of symptoms 
related to a space-occupying lesion in the central nervous system. After biopsy 
demonstrating a lymphoma, and further evaluation that shows that the 
lymphoma is localized to the one location in the brain, the neurologist will 
identify the patient as suffering from a Primary Central Nervous System 
Lymphoma (“PCNSL”). In terms of nomenclature, PCNSL merely identifies the 
anatomical location of a tumor type. To a hematologist who might be called 
upon to prescribe the appropriate chemotherapy for this localized lymphoma, the 
primary concern will be which pathological subtype of lymphoma cells and 
organizational structure are present as this will guide treatment, e.g., B-cell or 
T-cell; follicular or diffuse, etc. Lymphomas are discussed or classified in the 
hematological literature in terms of pathological subtype. For example, see the 
Revised European-American Lymphoma Classification which lists about 40 
lymphoma subtypes in terms of morphology, phenotype and genotype, without 
mentioning PCNSL. THOMAS J. KIPPS, WILLIAMS HEMATOLOGY 1316–17 (7th 
ed. 2006). 
 In terms of toxic torts, a hematologist convinced that benzene can cause 
lymphoma would reason that the location of the lymphoma is of little 
consequence as lymphocytes are diffusely present within the body, are known to 
move from organ to organ, and localized lymphomas are not unusual in almost 
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Also favorable to the defendant is the use of mechanistic 
understanding to discard a presumed cause and effect relationship. 
For example, saccharin has been downgraded by the National 
Toxicology Program from its previous listing as reasonably 
anticipated to be a human carcinogen.64 A major reason for this 
change was the finding of a mechanism to explain why bladder 
cancer was observed in laboratory animals exposed to saccharin. 
This mechanism was one that had a threshold, permitting regulators 
to move away from a no-threshold model for carcinogens. The dose 
to exceed the threshold was well above any reasonable expectation 
in humans consuming saccharin.65 
Another example of using mechanistic principles to downgrade 
an epidemiological finding comes from a recent IARC review of 
formaldehyde. A long term follow up of a formaldehyde-exposed 
cohort by an excellent group of epidemiologists found a 
statistically significant increase in leukemia incidence. However, 
based on mechanistic grounds, it was difficult to conceive of a 
mechanism by which exposure to formaldehyde could cause 
leukemia. Despite the “strong evidence” in human studies, IARC 
                                                           
any part of the body; although of particularly great consequence within the 
limited space of the skull. In contrast, a defense lawyer would take the 
reductionist approach of insisting that there be epidemiological evidence linking 
benzene specifically to PCNSL and would likely ask the court to discard any 
evidence linking benzene to lymphoma as not being sufficiently specific to the 
disease. 
64 See National Toxicology Program: Department of Health and Human 
Services, Report on Carcinogens, “Saccharin” (2005), available at 
http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/INDEX.CFM?OBJECTID=BE49AE97-F1F6-975E-
77FE65CCD04657CF (last visited Mar. 22, 2008). 
65 Joe G. Hollingsworth & Eric G. Lasker, in a review of Daubert 
avowedly from a defense lawyer’s perspective, claims that the downgrading of 
the saccharin decision shows the failure of toxicology to be borne out. Joe G. 
Hollingsworth & Eric G Lasker, The Case Against Differential Diagnosis:  
Daubert, Medical Causation Testimony, and the Scientific Method, 37(1) J. 
HEALTH L. 90 (2004). Indeed, the opposing opinion is much more accurate. 
The fact that a previous weakly positive epidemiological study was not 
replicated likely would not have been enough to overcome the usual regulatory 
resistance to downgrading a potential human carcinogen without the new 
information on mechanism.  See L. B. Ellwein & S. M.  Cohen, The Health 
Risks of Saccharin Revisited, 20(5) CRIT. REV. TOXICOL. 311–26 (1990). 
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classified the overall evidence that formaldehyde caused leukemia 
as “not sufficient.”66 Similarly, evidence of cancer in laboratory 
animal studies can be scientifically discounted as has occurred for 
the finding that exposure of male rats to gasoline causes kidney 
cancer through a mechanism not operative in humans.67 
Mechanistic understanding also helps with interpreting latency 
periods between exposure and disease. The latency period is a 
particularly important point for understanding cancer caused by 
chemicals as such periods can be too short or too long to be 
consistent with the known biological processes involved in the 
causation of disease. Some examples are obvious because they are 
within the experience of a layperson.  For instance, one can readily 
reject a plaintiff’s allegation that someone hit them in the eye two 
weeks before the plaintiff first noted a black eye. It would hardly 
be necessary for an expert to convince a jury by giving scientific 
testimony about the biological mechanisms that convert trauma 
into skin discoloration. In other situations, however, understanding 
of the mechanism underlying the disease process, coupled with the 
existing epidemiological literature concerning latency periods, is a 
                                                           
66 “The working group also found . . . ‘strong but not sufficient evidence’ 
for leukaemia. The finding for leukaemia reflects the epidemiologists’ finding of 
strong evidence in human studies coupled with an inability to identify a 
mechanism for induction of leukaemia, based on the data available at this time.”  
Press Release, World Health Organization’s International Agency for Research 
on Cancer, IARC Classifies Formaldehyde as Carcinogenic to Humans (June 15, 
2004), available at http://www.iarc.fr/ENG/Press_Releases/archives/pr153a. 
html.  See also Vincent J. Cogliano et al., Meeting Report:  Summary of IARC 
Monographs on Formaldehyde, 2-Butoxyethanol, and 1-tert-Butoxy-2-Propanol, 
113(9) ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1205–08 (2005). 
67 In yet another example of more inclusiveness of toxicology data, an 
Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) committee has recently recommended additional 
consideration of the non-epidemiological database and of dose in the evaluation 
process used to classify the scientific basis for presumptive disability decisions 
made by the Veterans Administration. This would be a change from the 
previous process in which the IOM classification was almost totally based upon 
epidemiological findings. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COMMITTEE ON 
EVALUATION OF THE PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
FOR VETERANS, IMPROVING THE PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY DECISION-MAKING 
PROCESS FOR VETERANS (Jonathan M. Samet & Catherine C. Bodurow eds., 
2008). 
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valuable part of evaluating a potential toxic tort. 
CONCLUSION 
Much of the legal commentary concerning science reflects the 
issue of how to fairly bring the state of the art into the courtroom. 
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer commented, “A judge is not 
a scientist and a courtroom is not a scientific laboratory,” but 
judges “must aim for decisions that, roughly speaking, 
approximately reflect the scientific state of the art.”68 The core 
understanding of dose issues related to toxic torts reflects a 
scientific state of art that is at least 500 years old.69 Unfortunately, 
as judges attempt to simplify complex issues related to causality, 
there are too many instances in which relatively simple and 
straightforward scientific understanding concerning dose is being 
discarded or obfuscated. 
 
                                                           
68 Justice Breyer Calls for Experts To Aid Courts in Complex Cases, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 17, 1998, at A17. 
69 Michael A. Gallo, History and Scope of Toxicology, in CASARETT & 
DOULL’S TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS 3–11 (Curtis D. 
Klaassen ed., 5th ed. 1996). 
